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ABSTRACT 
Outside the shores of Africa, the idea of African Philosophy is rejected and within the confines of 
Western Universities, it is the usual practice to designate every study that pertains to the continent of 
Africa as African studies, rather than African Philosophy. Among researchers, teachers, 
Philosophers in African universities, the debate on the reality or not of African Philosophy is yet to 
wane. What the issues are and what the solutions can be are what this paper sets to examine. The 
idea of this venture is to interrogate the contending arguments, people and themes and explore the 
parameters that can set the tone in constructing and reconstructing African Philosophy to be in line 
with Western and oriental Philosophies. This paper asserts that African Philosophy can apply the 
methods of Science to arrive at its foundations and stand on the same platforms with Western and 
Oriental Philosophy in discussing the same issues but from different perspectives. 
KEYWORDS: Construct, Reconstruct and Science. 
 
Introduction 
Not a few would argue that the subject matter and contemporary issues associated with Philosophy as 
an academic discipline is relatively young and at an infancy stage in Africa. It is important to note 
that the emphasis here is on the idea of Philosophy being an academic discipline or activity in the 
continent. This necessarily connotes that there is no argument on the existence of Philosophical 
thoughts and ideas in the continent but how academic are these ideas. This is the crux of the matter. 
At the same time, can we say that as a habit or a nature of thoughts and reflection, Philosophy is 
similarly new in Africa, especially in the South of the Sahara. Indeed there is no disputing the fact 
that Philosophy, as an everyday activity, is as old as the continent of Africa. The issue is the 
academic aspect of this activity and the late arrival of formal education in the continent may have 
contributed greatly to this. 
Like so many other activity, it is indeed very normal and pedestal for any group of humans or 
community of people to possess some kind of world view, ideas and outlook which are basically 
some general assumptions and conceptions about the world around them and in which they live and 
interact, including how they see issues about themselves and their experiences as either individuals 
and communities or groups. This is without prejudice to their truth value. This means in effect, that 
rightly or wrongly, people hold beliefs about the universe and life generally, themselves and their 
society. The task of Philosophy is to examine how true these beliefs in the search for the true nature 
of reality. Views and beliefs as we know them in Africa most times fall under proverbs, thoughts 
about nature, religions and traditional understandings passed from generation to generation, in a 
mostly oral fashion. This lack of written materials in the African world is the main challenge facing 
the practice of African Philosophy, hence the controversy of its reality. This same lack of written 
material impeded the academics of Philosophy in Africa. 
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Making this point better understood, Wireldu (1989) explains this dilemma into two broad 
understanding of Philosophy in Africa: “In the first sense, Philosophy is a technical discipline in 
which our world outlook is subjected to a systematic scrutiny by rigorous ratiocinated methods. In 
the second sense, Philosophy is that way of viewing man and the world which results in a world 
outlook in the first place. It might be said then, that Philosophy in the first sense is a second order 
enterprise, for it is a reflection on Philosophy in the second sense.” (Wireldu, 1989, 1). This 
delineation clearly indicates that Philosophy as a critical and rigorous activity is different from 
Philosophy as a world view or belief. Philosophy thus is of a second order character, for that on 
which it reflects, namely our world view is itself a reflection on the more particularistic, more 
episodic judgements of ordinary day to day living. 
Is there, then, any point of convergence in these two mutually exclusive understanding of 
Philosophy? Is the demarcation by Wireldu (1989) very rigid and cast in iron? We must bear in mind 
that the subject matter of Philosophy in the first place is day to day living and the content of nature. 
On one hand, we have an activity that takes place almost unconsciously in our environment without 
we taking note and on the other hand is the systematic study and understanding of these events taking 
place. This is the great difference between Philosophy as a conscious study and Philosophy as an 
ordinary activity. The issue for us here is to draw a line between when a people can be said to have a 
philosophy and when a person can be said to be doing Philosophy. For those who question the reality 
of formal Philosophy in Africa, they depend solely on the content of active and academic study of 
the everyday activities of the Philosopher as opposed to the world views of a people. Here 
philosophy is viewed as activities of persons and not a community set of beliefs. 
Some African scholars, however, are of the view that the question as to whether African Philosophy 
qualifies as a Philosophical discipline is political, because Hume and Hegel has taken it for granted 
that the Negro African was bereft of Philosophical reflection, or else why is the existence of 
European, Indian, Asian and Greek Philosophies taken for granted, whereas people look away when 
the concept of African Philosophy is mentioned. Njoku (2002,1) belongs to this line of thinking and 
argues that: “ the reservations against the backdrop of the status of African Philosophy are part of the 
Western propaganda to deny the faculty of rationality and reflection to the African and confines him 
to conventional or primitive mentality as his preserve”. His take is that African Philosophy is carved 
out of the influences of cultural history, religion, colonial experience and Christianity. The African, 
to him tries to respond to contemporary challenges as an African, Christian and a member of the 
larger world. 
Sentiments aside, are there no clear differences between History, Philosophy, Sociology and 
Anthropology? In all my study of Philosophy, Philosophy appears more like a tool in accessing 
reality and not some kind of cultural heritage. This argument by Njoku (2002) and other apologists of 
African Philosophy diminishes the fact that resorting to emotivism in the Philosophical discourse 
would only delay the take-off of the reality of African Philosophy. Philosophy takes everyday 
activity as the object of its activities and those everyday activities and experiences cannot turn round 
to be the Philosophy of the Philosopher. Philosophy must have boundaries and the boundaries must 
guide the Philosopher. Clearly, Africa was very late in coming to the era of civilization and 
modernization and this should not make any African scholar inferior or less intelligent and the 
inability for the African to critically examine the content of his thoughts as handed down to him and 
his ability to reflect critically on issues around him of universal nature must not be blamed on 
western Philosophers who in the first place provide the content of the subject of Philosophy. With 
these clearly stated, must there therefore be a contention on what should constitute African 
Philosophy as it is with Western and Oriental Philosophies? This is the crux of the matter as we go 
forward. 
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Deconstructing African Philosophy 
As a background, let’s keep ourselves abreast with the basic understanding of Philosophy as we 
know it and then delve into Philosophy as African Philosophers want us to know it. According to 
Thompson (2012), Philosophy asks very fundamental questions that are universal by nature. 
Questions such as, how has the universe come into being? Who are we? Do we have a soul that is 
separate from our bodies? Have we lived before and will we live again and resurrect? How are we to 
decide between right and wrong? What is justice and how do we know it? Do we always have to live 
with the consequences of our action? Is there a God or gods? Questions such as these have answers 
in different cultures and traditions. This is what is worth exploring in every Philosophy including 
African Philosophy. These questions are universal and the potential answers to them vary between 
cultures. With this basic understanding, our discussion can make more sense. 
For me, the biggest problem confronting African Philosophy is what should constitute its content. In 
so many cases, I have had to engage friends and colleagues on what really we mean when we say 
African Philosophy. While some advocates see it as content, I see it as a tool. If Philosophy is seen as 
a critical examination of nature and issues of everyday living, then African Philosophy must follow 
in that line as Africans critically examining nature and issues of everyday living and the starting 
point is the issues of ancient beliefs and tradition in Africa. Those very beliefs, cultures and 
traditions that have been handed down from past generation should be examined with the tool of 
Philosophy. With this as a background, there is a problem with the views of some Philosophers as 
captured by Wikipedia, which sees African Philosophy as the Philosophical discourse produced in 
Africa or by indigenous Africans. The term African Philosophy covers the Philosophy made by 
African descendants including African Americans. 
Perhaps the forerunner of what is being debated as African Philosophy is Placide Tempels. Tempels 
(1959) in his book “Bantu Philosophy explicitly claimed that Philosophy can be gathered from the 
cultural and sphere. He saw his views as applying to the Bantu family of ethnic groups as a whole 
and not just to the Baluba people first before Africans in general. His case study, therefore in 
advocating the existence of African Philosophy is Baluba tribe in central Africa. Tempels argues that 
Philosophy is a collective property of all the individuals of a culture and their philosophy is their 
lived experience. By observing the behaviour, customs and language of the Luba people, therefore, 
Tempels arrived at the Bantu philosophy. Here we see the beginning of the herd mentality in defining 
philosophy. 
He notes further that from the study of the myths and rituals of the Bantu, Tempels generalises and 
arrives at te conclusion that philosophy can be carved out of people’s cosmological ideas, which are 
held to be interwoven with their moral codes. The religious dimension of the Bantu beliefs about 
their ancestors, gods, and spirits lead one to their place in it, Tempels posits. Hence, philosophy 
becomes an expression of a world view, the collective value of a people often developed 
unconsciously in proverbs, riddles, stories and songs. As interesting as these views may be, one tends 
to think that Philosophy cannot just be about proverbs, songs and riddles but more about how those 
stories are arrived at and how reasonably true they are. We know that many African beliefs are 
handed down from generations and are not to be questioned…a situation that had made Africa to be 
seen as simply a dark continent. 
Writing in the same direction but with a little slant, John S. Mbiti equally tries to construct an 
African Philosophy from his religious background and ties Philosophy in Africa to religion, 
especially Christianity. Imagine trying to construct an African Philosophy with Christianity. In his 
argument, just like Tempels and Oruka, Mbiti proposed that religion permeates all aspects of the life 
of the average African and religion is discerned in terms of beliefs, ceremonies, rituals and religious 
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ceremonies. He claims that philosophy unlike religion cannot be observed in terms of specific acts of 
people who engage in it, and is convinced that Philosophy concerns itself with people’s lives and it is 
in the study of African religious acts that one can discover the Philosophy behind them. For Mbiti, 
therefore, Philosophy is found in the history, culture and religion of the African people. Noting that it 
is needless to talk of a specialized discipline called Philosophy. 
Henry Odera Oruka, arguably one of the earliest voices of African Philosophy in a research carried 
out in 1974 on the nature of African Philosophy, believes that sage Philosophy is a horizon of 
insights and judgement belonging to community as a whole in its understanding of life as represented 
by some persons within the group. Community here means an African village. For Odera (2002) 
sagacity or sage philosophy is the thought of wise men and women within the group or community. 
In critically examining this understanding, we are confronted with the simple idea of Philosophy 
being a person’s or a groups’ set of beliefs. Philosophy in the modern sense has definitely gone 
beyond this and has assumed the life of a critical tool to arrive at the truth of reality in all spheres of 
human endeavour. To therefore see philosophy as words from supposedly wise men and women is to 
reduce the significance and meaning of Philosophy. 
For Oruka, the basic principles of philosophic sagacity, which forms his idea of African philosophy 
is that in both traditional and modern Africa, there exists men and women, literate and illiterate who 
commonly engage in philosophical reflection on various problems of human life and nature in 
general. Philosophic sagacity searches for such individuals and thinkers in the traditional community 
and in his method, Oruka and his colleagues went  with tape recorders into villages of different 
ethnic communities in Kenya to engage those who were thought by their own communities to be 
wise. It is clear to see what Odera tries to paint here and it has to do with words of people who are 
judged to be wise. Problem is,  in this modern era, how do you merely judge wisdom by words of a 
person and how do you judge the words as being true or mere fantasy. Many proverbs in Africa taken 
for granted by people fall flat in the face of critical examination as most of them are not a priori by 
nature. In spite of the obvious short fall in the full application of the philosophical method which is 
known to all students and teachers of Philosophy, Odera (1991, 33) still anchored his idea of African 
Philosophy on the argument that sage Philosophy: “is a way of thinking and explaining the world 
that fluctuates between popular wisdom (well-known communal maxims, aphorisms and general 
common sense truths) and didactic wisdom (an expounded wisdom and rational thought of some 
given individuals within the community). While popular wisdom is often conformist, didactic 
wisdom is at times critical of the communal set up and of popular wisdom”. As interesting as this 
may sound, Oruka has not produced and in fact, there is no shred of evidence where this took place 
anywhere in Africa. 
Sage Philosophy is argued further to be a horizon of insights and good judgement and such 
judgement can be expressed in two ways: popular or folk sagacity and philosophic sagacity. Where 
popular sagacity consists in popular maxims, philosophic sagacity finds expression in the expounded 
wisdom and rational thought of some given individuals in the community. Philosophic sagacity to 
Oruka bears witness to the private world of individuals in the community. It is the sphere of critical 
independent thinkers who guide their thought and judgment by the power of reason and inborn 
insights rather than by the authority of communal consensus. The point being made here is that a 
sage person is we versed in the wisdom and traditions of his community. The person reflects the 
wisdom and traditions of the community but a philosophic sage goes beyond folk or mere sagacity. 
His stand before the inherited beliefs and wisdom of his people is that of a critical reflective attitude. 
He is not a mere reporter of the traditions but a critical participant, a thinker. Wireldu (1989) argues 
against this seriously, noting that genuine Philosophy demands the application to any thought, critical 
analysis and rigorous arguments. 
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Masolo (1994) counters Oruka when he argued that philosophic sagacity is not philosophy and based 
on the Socratic Method, Masolo’s analysis shows how frequently tradition and opinion are based on 
insufficient reasoning. For Masolo then, true philosophy relies on analysis, definition, and 
explanation. Pre-Socratic knowledge according to him has no place in strict philosophy and 
philosophical sagacity falls into the category of pre-Socratic philosophy. Was Masolo right in 
asserting that philosophy before the emergence of Philosophy is not philosophy? What do we say 
about Oriental Philosophy that existed centuries before Socrates and has so many footprints in 
Western Philosophy? The point Masolo made has to do with the ability of the individuals in Oruka to 
apply proper reasoning in making their observations. Perhaps Oruka should have told us the level of 
understanding of his wise men and women of the things they were talking about that finally gave 
them the toga of wisdom. In a typical village of illiterates, anything can be termed as wise. 
Wiredu (1989) in also picking holes in the arguments of ethno philosophers, believes that the African 
Philosopher has a unique opportunity to re-examine many of the assumptions of Western Philosophy 
by subjecting them to an interrogation based on African language and if I may add African thought. 
He vehemently opposes the ethno-philosophical and philosophical sagacity approaches to African 
Philosophy as enunciated by Odera Oruka1, noting that all cultures have their distinctive folk beliefs 
and world view, but that those must be distinguished from the practice of philosophizing. The 
understanding here is that philosophising is an activity, rather than a destination and we must see 
Philosophy as a tool, an activity and means rather than an end. To this extent, the contents and 
objects of philosophy cannot be seen as Philosophy itself. This is where the confusion is brewed for 
those that promote African philosophy. 
On the definition of African Philosophy, Wiredu further argues that the term African Philosophy was 
seen by Mbiti as the classical exposition of African Philosophy to refer to the understanding attitude 
of mind, Logic and perception behind the manner in which African people think, act or speak in 
different situations of life: “On this showing, th existence of African Philosophy seemed distinctly 
compatible with a philosophical inarticulateness on the 1Henry Odera Oruka is of Kenyan origin and 
is known to be one of the first promoters of African Philosophy with his views on Philosophical 
sagacity. part of the traditional African. This did not seem to have worried Mbiti who even remarked 
, what therefore is African Philosophy, may not amount to more than simply my own process of 
philosophizing the items under consideration; but this cannot be helped and in any case I am by birth 
an African”. Wiredu argues that in Mbiti’s view thus, African Philosophy was held to be an implicit 
philosophy. It was the Philosophy implicit in the life, thought and talk of the traditional African, 
ethics and morals of the society concerned. 
Still examining Mbiti’s position on African Philosophy, Wiredu argues that Mbiti’s position follows 
that any African’s philosophizing on relevant African data can only consist of making explicit what 
is implicit there in. This, he says means that the result of contemporary work in philosophy in Africa 
can never attain any status other than that of a semi anthropological paraphrase of African traditional 
beliefs. Wiredu (1989) goes ahead to also puncture some of the ideas of Placide Tempels by asserting 
that exactly a decade before Mbiti, Placide Tempels had expounded much the same conception of 
African Philosophy in his Bantu Philosophy published in 1959. Wiredu makes it clear that 
Hountondji, who happens to be a severe critic of the concept of African Philosophy represented by 
Tempels and Mbiti objected to their tendency to postulate unanimity in Philosophical beliefs among 
various African peoples or even with the entire African race. For Hountondji, Wiredu cites there is 
no African Philosophy based on any kind of community among Africans, a view Wiredu sees as just. 
In looking at all the foregoing presentations, what readily comes to mind is whether there is no 
demarcation between traditional beliefs and philosophy. The answer lies in asking if there is anything 
known as the philosophical method or the Socratic Method. I know this would be dismissed as a 
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Western creation to dim the reality of African Philosophy. Mbiti’s ideas thus create a big hole in the 
definition of Philosophy. Must any definition be personal, sectional, ethnic, religious and tribal? The 
answer is definitely in the negative. Philosophy must be philosophy everywhere and anywhere with 
common methods and common methodology and the definition must universal. Two trends have 
emerged so far in this discourse: On the one hand is te view that African Philosophy is that which has 
inherited by today’s Africans through the oral tradition and it is the duty of an African Philosopher to 
collect, interpret and disseminate African proverbs, folktales, myths and other traditional materials. 
On the other hand is the group that maintains that African Philosophy ought to in this day and age 
take cognisance of modern developments in Knowledge and reflection. In this group are Wiredu, 
Bodunrin and Hountondji. For example, Wiredu (1989) notes that African Philosophy is mainly the 
result of he thought of African Philosophers, traditional as well as modern. Those who promote this 
second option do not believe that in modern times, Philosophy must remain a communal body of 
thought or knowledge. Instead they emphasise the importance of debate and inevitability of pluralism 
and diversity in opinion. This is what Hountondji has been particularly keen on emphasising. For 
him, African Philosophy is a kind of literature produced by Africans dealing with Philosophical 
problems. This definition sees to exclude African traditional communal thought from the bounds of 
African Philosophy. It however, includes within the bounds, writings that expound and interpret 
African traditional world. 
One aspect of Hountondji’s definition that is interesting is the idea that a philosophical work by an 
African need not be about a specially African topic in order to qualify as African Philosophy. This 
aspect of Hountondji’s work is seen by Wiredu as progressive on the whole: Hountondji puts the 
matter thus: “just as the anthropological study of African societies by 
Western scientific literature, likewise the philosophical studies of Western tradition by African 
scholars are part and parcel of African Philosophy literature as are all philosophical investigation 
made by Africans about conceptions which may have no special or privileged links with African 
experience” (Wiredu 1982, 6) 
Concluding, Wiredu explains that African Philosophy is not just the world view of traditional 
African societies as African Philosophers are active today, trying to achieve a synthesis of 
philosophical insights of their ancestors with whatever is of philosophical worth they can extract 
from the intellectual resources of the modern world. 
Constructing African Philosophical method 
Like science, one major plank upon which Philosophy stands is the foundation of explanation. It is 
trite to assert that whatever cannot be scientifically explained is not science and whatever is not 
science is either nonsensical or superstitious and this is the biggest cloud covering the reality of 
African Philosophy.. What most advocates of African Philosophy call so is nothing but some fetish 
inexplicable phenomena that lack explanation and reason. It is in this direction that many scholars 
have questioned the validity of African Philosophy as it is currently stated. It is very common to read 
and hear arguments that the words of the ancestors, gods and deities are sacrosanct in African 
culture. Good as this may be in the traditional setting, how is the problem of truth about the 
assertions by these entities whose very existence and reality are in doubt anyway resolved. Can one 
predict the future based on the words of a native doctor who is said to be speaking for the gods? This 
is very important for the establishment of knowledge and epistemology. 
Latching on to this problem of an acceptable or clear methodology of doing African Philosophy, 
Anyanwu (1989) argues that those who are abreast of the philosophical activities of Philosophers 
would be baffled and discouraged by the apparent contradictions and conflicts between different 
philosophers on the same issues. For him: “the assumptions about the meaning or nature of 
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Philosophy determine the methods which they would adopt as the trustworthy route to knowledge, 
that is , what they regard as the “true” knowledge of reality. Furthermore, personal experience and 
religious beliefs, educational background and the financial interests influence the thoughts of 
Philosophers and many philosophers hide these facts and dogmatically assert that they alone possess 
the philosophy worthy of that name” (Anyanwu, 1989, 127) 
Anyanwu’s (1989) argument simply ties the idea of method in Philosophy to the philosopher beliefs. 
Does this then conclude that there cannot be one acceptable universal way of doing Philosophy and 
describing the nature of Philosophy? Does this not make the method of Philosophy subjective and at 
best relative? Western and Oriental Philosophies seem to have shattered this assumption as 
Philosophy has gone on endlessly in these two worlds. That Western Philosophy and Oriental 
Philosophies have gone on this long with progressive developments where disagreements and 
counter positions are being canvassed only attests to the fact that there is a method all practitioners 
follow in doing philosophy. The issue of method therefore, cannot be personal as Anyanwu asserts. 
A Philosopher that is not properly educated on a particular subject can thus get up and make 
assertions that students and teachers are expected to read or accept. To me, this creates serious 
integrity and quality control for the practice of Philosophy. 
African Philosophy seems to be in a prison and since there is no general agreement as to what it is or 
what it ought to be. There is no surprise that there is also no general agreement as to what its 
methods should be. Anyanwu (1989) believes that there are many methods of 
Philosophy such as descriptive, analytic, critical, synthetic and speculative. I would rather not see 
these schools as methods but communities. Just as you have scientific communities working on 
different research programs using the same methods, that’s what Philosophy also employs in doing 
different aspects of the Philosophical enterprise. Anyanwu (1989) continues that it is not unusual that 
certain philosophers establish their own favoured methods as the absolute method of doing 
philosophy and reject all other methods. If this line of thinking is accepted, the entire edifice of 
science would collapse and society would be plunged into darkness. We believe so strongly that 
Philosophy and science share very similar missions and must therefore share similar methods. 
From the foregoing, and based on the argument of people like Anyanwu, there is no unanimity on the 
method of doing African Philosophy and this is the based on the lack of unanimity on the its nature . 
While Anyanwu may seem to have done justice in countering those who objected to African 
Philosophy as African culture, and tradition, he offered no help in laying any foundation or base on 
the method most suitable to African Philosophy. For us, the debate should not be whether there is 
anything like African Philosophy or not but be about doing African Philosophy under the shadow of 
Western Philosophy. The issue should be how to apply the Philosophical, Socratic and scientific 
methods in arriving at what can be accepted as African Philosophy by readers outside Africa. The 
two schools  around the debate are obviously in pursuit of the reality of African Philosophy and the 
way out is the introduction of a method that is not only acceptable but equally universal. 
My argument remains that Western and Oriental Philosophy began where African Philosophy is 
currently standing: Ancient ancestral beliefs, myths, traditions, customs, religion etc. The task before 
the Philosopher in Africa is to question, interrogate, and examine these beliefs within the contexts of 
modern tools such as reason, Logic and science in arriving at explanations and predictions and thus 
add to the universal body of knowledge. The debate must be about developing African Philosophy 
through a very scientific method and not about its existence as we have gone beyond that. For as long 
as Western and Oriental Philosophy have thrived through the centuries, African Philosophy must 
adapt to existing methods in Philosophy ad science to establish the rich and deep Philosophical 
thoughts in Africa on issues of justice, equality, science, ethics, democracy, politics Being and 
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existence. We are not the recreate the wheel but to join the conversation on the wheel and add to its 
body. 
Reconstructing African Philosophy through the scientific method 
So many scholars, including scientists have questioned the role of Philosophy of science and its 
relevance to the growth of science. Truth is, there are so many things philosophers of science do in 
terms of research and study, and one central set of concerns is what is distinctive about science -- 
how science differs from other human activities, (especially bearing in mind that not every human 
activity can go as science), what underlies its body of knowledge, what features are necessary and 
relevant to scientific engagement with reality, etc. This means philosophers of science must have 
spent and still spend some good bit of time trying to find and draw the line between science and non-
science or what we call pseudo-science. Philosophy of science is also involved in trying to figure out 
the logic with which scientific claims are grounded, working to understand the relations between 
theory and empirical facts, and working out the common thread that binds many different but related 
scientific projects. 
Stemwedel (2014) argues that we can choose to think of this set of philosophical projects as trying to 
give an account of what science is trying to do -- how science attempts to construct a picture of the 
world that is accountable to the world in a particular way, how that picture of the world develops and 
changes in response to further empirical information (among other factors), and what kind of 
explanations can be given for the success of scientific accounts (insofar as they have been 
successful). Frequently, the philosopher is concerned with "Science" rather than a particular field of 
science. As well, some philosophers are more concerned with an idealized picture of science as an 
optimally rational knowledge building activity -- something they will emphasize is quite different 
from science as actually practiced. 
She believes that practicing scientists pretty much want to know how to handle questions in their 
particular fields of science and if the goal is to understand the digestive system of some exotic bug, 
you may have no use at all for a subtle account of scientific theory change, let alone for a firm stand 
on the question of scientific anti-realism. You have much more use for information about how to 
catch the bug, how to get to its digestive system, what sorts of things you could observe, measure or 
manipulate that could give you useful information about its digestive system, how to collect good 
data, how to tell when you've collected enough data to draw useful conclusions, appropriate methods 
for processing the data and drawing conclusions, and so forth. This is obviously how science flows 
If it is accepted then, that the core aim of science is to explain and predict both natural and social 
events and phenomena, then the issue of truth is important and the process of ascertaining the truth 
becomes also important. This is because there are natural and non- natural explanations in doing 
science. A natural explanation can be described as one that follows the scientific method while the 
non-natural is one that can be described as superstitious or magical and the difference is found in 
result. While the former provides positives most times, the later ends up in disasters. This is the core 
of this section of the quest for method in African Philosophy. Until the Philosopher in Africa adopts 
this system of reasoning and build their research on the imperative of scientific explanation, their 
endeavour would continue to fall short of the set standard. Research all over the world has a set a 
standard and it cannot be different in the research in African Philosophy 
The main difference between Western societies and African societies in our estimation is the fact that 
while the West relies on the scientific method, African societies still rely on the relics of traditions 
and cultures which are based on pure superstition and supernatural explanations which are not 
verifiable. In the practice of medicine and psychology to name but two for example, African societies 
depend on their gods and their ancestors for explanations, making them primordial even with the 
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advent of modernity. The result is disaster. The whole essence of science we might argue is to be 
able to solve human problems with the ability to explain and predict. For any society to make 
progress therefore, it must be able to use the understandings, explanations and predictions of science 
to create solutions and inventions. This is where the relevance of African Philosophy in the universal 
body of knowledge can be established. Beyond the works of local native doctors and diviners, 
African scholars must realise that knowledge becomes useless, nonsensical and meaningless when 
explanation is absent. 
Not too many people would agree with the German Philosopher, Paul Fyerabend when he argued 
that there is actually no difference between science and non-science even though we cannot dispute 
the fact that sometimes the beginning of science is superstition. The method of science has made it 
very clear that for a method to be scientific it must be based on Induction or deduction and they are 
both anchored on observation, research,  experiment and verification. The position that the 
demarcation between science and non- science is thin cannot stand the test of time and died naturally 
with Fyerabend expectedly. The place of superstition in the growth of African Philosophy, therefore, 
can only be argued within the context of the beginning of philosophy and science itself. For instance 
when the Ionian philosophers talked about the primary element of nature, they provided no evidence 
in the argument on Water (Thales), Air (Anaximander) and boundless (Anaximenes). They made 
their arguments purely from the perspective of superstition but the scientific method today has 
completely nullified their views with better explanations formulated and as such there is more 
certainty in the enterprise of solving problems through research and study. 
It is based on the foregoing that the issue of method in science is as important as science itself and 
this is transposed with the importance of method in African Philosophy. For the world to find 
African Philosophy relevant, it must be defined within the lines of research, observation, experiment, 
analysis etc. This section is out therefore, to dig deep into the issue of the method of science being 
useful in the resolution of the problem of method in African Philosophy. In other words, what makes 
the processes of African Philosophy scientific as opposed to superstition, mythical or magical? 
Certainty, method, explanation and truth are at the core of knowledge and anything contrary would 
be destructive. That  the world today is ruled by science is to state the obvious and science has 
become the core of life itself in society. This reality is what some of us as the reason why Philosophy 
in Africa must not be whimsical, personal or relative. The enterprise of African Philosophy must 
cohere with the demands of science, no matter how rigorous they may be. 
In achieving the purpose of this section, we are juxtaposing the views of three major philosophers of 
science, Kuhn and his scientific revolution, Popper and his conjectures and refutations and Lakatos’ 
research programme on the debate hitherto discussed in the work. We are laying emphasis on these 
three persons because they provide the core arguments in the issue of method and truth in the process 
of science which we believe can give the practice of African Philosophy the much needed impetus 
and momentum to flourish. Their views represent the benchmark in the understanding of what 
science is and what truth is in science and Philosophy. There three positions form a template upon 
which more ideas could be discovered. It is therefore common to observe that any meaningful 
deliberation on method and science must be about the three philosophers of science. At the end of the 
discussion, it should be obvious that they represent the solution to the quagmire in which African 
Philosopher is stuck. 
Reconstructing African Philosophy: Conjectures and Refutations in Karl Popper 
It was Paul Fyerabend that argued that there is really no strong demarcation between science and 
non-science or magic. The same way Tempels, Mbiti and Oruka argue that African Philosophy flows 
on its own accord. His argument was that science itself began on these notes and was a result of 
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superstition and that science is simply the examination of ordinary and lay man’s views of reality and 
phenomena. Perhaps Popper(1963) laid his foundational views on science on this idea. Little wonder, 
he argues that nothing in the scientific enterprise is based on certainty. For him, the scientific 
enterprise is more of trial and error, what he termed conjecture or bold guesses and the only way to 
confirm the veracity of any assertion is not to prove it but to refute it and the more a theory or view 
survives a refutation, the closer it gets to the truth which he terms verisimilitude. Popper’s position is 
that our knowledge, and especially our scientific knowledge, progresses by unjustified (and 
unjustifiable) anticipations, by guesses, by tentative solutions; in a word by conjectures and are not 
based on any stated paradigms or theories as adumbrated by Kuhn. This falls squarely within the 
arguments of advocates of African Philosophy and this method is worth examining within their 
arguments and relevance can be established. 
Plausible as these ideas are in the elucidation of the aim of science which is truth, Popper cannot go 
without opposition. Philosophers such as Kuhn, Fyerabend, Lakatos and some others raised and 
developed strong views against Popper. Lieberson (1982) on his part argues strongly that Popper’s 
falsification method cannot arrive at the truth, arguing that if we adopt Popper’s description of the 
aim of science as the truth, it is pointless to pursue his method of conjectures and refutations, for he 
denies they can arrive at any rational claim to the truth. Going by this opposition therefore, African 
Philosopher must bear this in mind  and adopt a method that can effectively lead to the attainment of 
truth. Rationality in Philosophy is as important as rationality in science. For Philosophy to make 
sense, it must be rational and stand the test o explanation. To thus build a Philosophy on some 
argument about tradition and community beliefs negates the rudiments of what constitutes 
knowledge. 
Just as the ideas of Popper, as interesting as they may be were rejected by the community of the 
Philosophers of science, a lesson must be drawn that the advocates of African Philosophy must also 
understand that the community of African scholars can reject their views or method as the case may 
be. No one has absolute knowledge and all researchers must be guided by the rules of engagement. 
Popper (1963) looked at the growth of scientific knowledge from a totally different perspective and 
its novelty attracted attention. The idea of conjecture itself may look simple but on close 
examination, we find that Popper was not out of touch. It has stated in so many places that the 
growth of medicine is based on trial and error and none of its postulates are perfect. Falsification is 
nothing but verification in a different way. To falsify a theory is simply to verify it but from a 
different approach. African Philosophy can also move in this route. 
Reconstructing African Philosophy with the Structure of Scientific Revolutions of Thomas 
S. Kuhn 
Kuhn (1972) made several notable claims concerning the progress of scientific knowledge. He 
argued that scientific fields undergo periodic "paradigm shifts" rather than solely progressing in a 
linear and continuous way, and that these paradigm shifts open up new approaches to understanding 
what scientists would never have considered valid before; and that the notion of scientific truth, at 
any given moment, cannot be established solely by objective criteria but is defined by a consensus of 
a scientific community. Competing paradigms are frequently incommensurable; that is, they are 
competing and irreconcilable accounts of reality. Thus, our comprehension of science can never rely 
wholly upon "objectivity" alone. Science must account for subjective perspectives as well, since all 
objective conclusions are ultimately founded upon the subjective conditioning/worldview of its 
researchers and participants. African Philosophy in applying this method must eschew any form of 
universal method but must mobilize the academic community I arriving at their basic theories rather 
some personal, whimsical and relative idea of what African Philosophy should be. 
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To discover the core relation between rules, paradigms, and normal science, consider first how the 
historian isolates the particular models of commitment that can be described as accepted rules. Close 
historical investigation of a given field at a given time discloses a set of recurrent and quasi-standard 
illustrations of various theories in their conceptual, observational, and instrumental applications. The 
shared views and products of research remain the bible of a scientific community found in journals 
and books. These are the community’s paradigms, revealed in its textbooks, lectures, and laboratory 
exercises. By an intending member or serving member studying them and by practicing with them, 
they learn their trade. Despite occasional ambiguities, the paradigms of a mature scientific 
community can be determined with relative ease. This method is very germane in the method 
suitable for African Philosophy. Set standards, rules of engagements and paradigms are agreed upon 
and adhered to by all members of an academic community such as that of the African Philosophy 
The emergence of scientific revolutions and the growth of African Philosophy 
What are scientific revolutions, and what is their function in scientific development? Much of the 
answer to these questions has been anticipated in earlier sections. In particular, the preceding 
discussion has indicated that scientific revolutions are here taken to be those non-cumulative 
developmental episodes in which an older paradigm is replaced in whole or in part by an 
incompatible new one. There is more to be said, however, and an essential part of it can be 
introduced by asking one further question. Why should a change of paradigm be called a revolution? 
In the face of the vast and essential differences between political and scientific development, what 
parallelism can justify the metaphor that finds revolutions in both? One aspect of the parallelism 
must already be apparent. Political revolutions are inaugurated by a growing sense, often restricted to 
a segment of the political community, that existing institutions have ceased adequately to meet the 
problems posed by an environment that they have in part created. In much the same way, scientific 
revolutions are inaugurated by a growing sense, again often restricted to a narrow subdivision of the 
scientific community, which an existing paradigm has ceased to function adequately in the 
exploration of an aspect of nature to which that paradigm itself had previously led the way. In both 
political and scientific development the sense of malfunction that can lead to crisis is prerequisite to 
revolution. 
Reconstructing African Philosophy with Imre Lakatos’ Research Programmes 
Imre Lakatos who was once a high ranking minister in the government of Hungary found the 
enterprise of science as a solace when politics became too hot to handle. After the Soviet crackdown 
in Hungary of 1957, Lakatos found his way to London where he allied himself with his fellow 
central European refugee, Karl Popper to forge a partnership that has made the views of Popper 
contending with those of Kuhn in the understanding of the methods of Science. Lakatos explicitly 
attacked Kuhn as making scientific beliefs subject to non-rational methods of mass persuasion, as 
fickle as matters of taste and style. Thus he sets out to  build a theory of the rationality of the growth 
of scientific belief over time which remained true to Popper's falsificationist views but admitted the 
historical evidence that Kuhn had presented to show that scientists do not abandon theories when 
confronted by so-called "counter-instances." Closely looking at the contention, one thing is clear and 
it is the fact that there is a definitely demarcation between rational and irrational science and it is not 
everything that can be allowed as Science. It is also obvious that method is key in the  growth of 
Science. As it goes for science, so it goes for African Philosophy as we adopt this argument fully. 
Research Programmes and the growth of African Philosophy 
Being an ally of Popper, Lakatos (2009) disagreed sharply with Kuhn and his idea of paradigm shift 
especially on the understanding that research communities abandon existing established traditions. 
The central analytical concept which Lakatos uses to replace Kuhn's "paradigms," therefore, is 
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designated as a "research programme." While the term "research program" is common in science, 
Lakatos gives this expression a very particular meaning in his philosophical proposition of the 
growth of scientific knowledge.. In the argument of Lakatos and in the explanation of what happens 
when scientists work in the communities, a research programme is essentially a sequence of theories 
and the application of these theories within a domain of scientific inquiries into different problems 
and challenges confronting the world. Individual successor theory according to Lakatos’ estimation 
is held to be a kind of advance version over its predecessor theory. The move from one theory to  its 
successor within a research programme, Lakatos categorises as a "problem shift." The question of the 
rationality of changing one's beliefs in science, or how scientific knowledge progresses over time, is 
thus transformed into the question of when a problem shift is progressive 
Problem shifts may be "progressive" in two ways: theoretically or empirically. Theoretically, 
progressive problem shifts are in effect deliberate moves to new theories which enable members of a 
scientific community to predict and explain more than a former theory allowed. On the other hand, 
problem shift is empirically progressive if in addition to predicting new observable evidence, actual 
observation does indeed confirm this new prediction. In order for a research programme, as a whole, 
to be progressive, each problem shift must be at least theoretically progressive, and at least 
occasionally empirically progressive. In other words in a progressive programme, each move from an 
old theory to a new one must enable the users to explain and predict more, and at least sometimes 
these must be confirmed. If a programme fails to display this characteristic, it is no longer 
progressive but has become "degenerating." A rational scientist should stick with a progressive 
programme but abandon a degenerating programme. In our estimation, this is close to the paradigm 
shift in Kuhn and the opposition of Lakatos is actually weak. 
The doctrine of Heuristics in African Philosophy 
Just as we found in the doctrine of paradigms in Kuhn being shared conclusions and generalizations 
in different scientific communities working on specific areas of research, Lakatos expresses his idea 
in a different form but basically in similar situation. In designing new theories to replace old, Lakatos 
argues that the scientist in a research programme adheres to a constellation of beliefs which Lakatos 
calls a "heuristic". This heuristic includes both positive and negative aspects. These heuristics are 
guides to the kind of research a scientist can conduct to further the knowledge base of his community 
or research programme. A deviation from set agreements can take a scientist out of the focus of 
research directions. 
The negative heuristic specifies certain claims of the research programme as not revisable: 
"tinkering" with these claims is not permitted as long as one adheres to the programme. They thus 
cordon off a "hard core" which cannot change from one theory to the next. Revising these beliefs is 
"off limits." This is Lakatos's analogue to Kuhn's contention that the normal scientist accepts a 
paradigm "dogmatically." A critical look at the ideas of Lakatos shows that they are not as violently 
different from those of Kuhn as Lakatos may want us to believe. In our conclusion, there is simply a 
very copious utilization of different nomenclature rather than drastic change of ideas or 
understanding of the processes of science. They are saying the same thing in different dictions and 
nuances. Their expressions further shows the method scientists employ in arriving at the truth, a 
veritable requirement of science 
The positive heuristic on the other hand represents a body of beliefs which are allied to the hard core 
as well as suggestions regarding how these beliefs can be revised. These beliefs can be tinkered with; 
indeed the life of the research programme essentially consists of learning how to reshape these 
beliefs in the light of potentially refuting observational evidence so as to protect the "hard core" from 
being refuted. Thus they form a "protective belt" surrounding the hard core. These heuristics are the 
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ones that would enhance the effectiveness of the hard core and give the communities the necessary 
data to push their conclusions closer and closer to the truth and make their work more certain. A 
member of a community or as Lakatos describes, research programme, conduct experiments and 
analysis to throw more light on the agreed hard cores as a way of achieving success of their work. 
As a research programme progresses, scientists involved would continue to refute or falsify the then 
accepted theory, in good falsificationist fashion. This is Lakatos's Popperian heritage. But when 
refuting evidence is encountered, according to the Lakatosian picture, the scientist will not consider 
the programme as "refuted." Instead he/she will begin to  alter the assumptions of the "protective 
belt" in ways permitted or suggested by the positive heuristic, such that the "hard core" of the 
programme can be retained unscathed. As long as such moves enable scientists to predict more new 
phenomena (i.e. it is theoretically progressive), and at least some of those predictions get confirmed 
by observation, the programme is progressing and it is rational to pursue it. However, when 
modifications to the theory only protect the hard core from refutation, but do not predict new 
phenomena, and/or none of those new predictions get confirmed by observation, then the programme 
is degenerating and the rational scientist abandons it. 
Unfortunately, critics are of the view that Lakatos is forced by the very historical evidence  he seeks 
to use to illustrate his image of science to admit that a programme can go through a "bad patch" i.e., 
a rather long period in which no empirical progress is made. Historically, looking back on the 
development of a science, it might be easy enough to tell that a programme is beginning to 
degenerate at a certain point in time. But this is a matter of hindsight and thus of no use to 
determining rationality. The question to be asked at this point is what about the scientist in the 
programme itself at that historical moment? How can he/she tell if the programme is truly now 
beginning to degenerate or if perhaps it is only undergoing a rough period? In order to know whether 
it's rational to stick with the programme or switch to another different programme, which rejects the 
old "hard core," such a question must be answerable. 
Conclusion 
From the falsification, verification views of Popper to the scientific revolution of Kuhn and the 
research programme theory of Lakatos, we come face to face with the theory that all aspects of the 
scientific project is in the public domain and rather than the idea of herd or community Philosophy, 
the practice is to have shared thoughts, methods and processes in an academic community working 
on different aspects of knowledge. Science progresses in a certain manner as agreed by members of 
the scientific community. The above analysis has thrown more light on the scientific method as a 
method that has been established in which every scientific enterprise must adhere to. For Philosophy 
to make sense in the 21st century, the views of ancient philosophy can no longer be accepted as they 
lack rational explanation and empirical verification. African Philosophical must be a literature of 
discussions by Africans on universal issues that have impacts in Africa and African thought. 
We can thus conclude that indeed African Philosophy can come alive and stand on the same podium 
with Western and Oriental philosophy as long as it is based on observation, experiments, analysis, 
etc. all linked to the scientific method. The quarrel on the existence or not of African Philosophy 
would be absolutely unnecessary when Philosophers in Africa depend less on the notion that African 
Philosophy can be distinct in method and content simply because they are Africans. The whole world 
is now linked with knowledge and science, making it possible for knowledge to be universal and 
useful to all peoples. In a contemporary world, the views of Tempels, Mbiti and Oruka cannot hold 
water and the idea of seeing the Philosophical/scientific method as Western imposition makes the 
discourse banal and nonsensical. Knowledge is universal, unchanging and permanent in its basic 
understanding and African Philosophers cannot reinvent the wheel or rewrite knowledge according 
MIDDLE EUROPEAN SCIENTIFIC BULLETIN ISSN 2694-9970  14  




their whims and caprice. The Philosophical and scientific method hinged on rationality, explanation, 
empirical observation, induction, deduction etc. cannot be replaced by any other system. With these 
we can assert that African Philosophy can be reconstructed and made to fit into the universal body of 
knowledge accessible by all people from all worlds. 
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